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Article 2

Arjun Guneratne

MACALESTER COLLEGE

Tharu – State Relations in Nepal and India
This paper examines the relationship of the Tharu, one of the more numerous of the ethnic groups that
inhabit the Tarai, to the various states that encompassed them during the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. These include the British colonial state and its Indian successor, the Shah and Rana
states of nineteenth and early twentieth century Nepal, and the modern Nepali state as it has developed since
1951. The paper argues that the political ecology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Tarai
made the Tharu an indispensable part of state building for both the British and for Rana Nepal. The capacity
of Tharu society to survive in often extreme malarial conditions made them an irreplaceable source of labor
in the Tarai while the Tharu elite furnished the state with a necessary cadre of lower-level administrators.
However, following on the economic and political transformations that took place in the post-1951 period,
the Nepali state’s interest in the Tarai changed, both as a function of bureaucratic development that made
the administrative role the Tharu had played largely irrelevant, as well as the emergence of the Tarai as a
crucial site of national identity building. The consequent marginalization of the Tharu was an important
factor shaping Tharu ethnic consciousness in the modern period.

When I arrived in Nepal in 1989 to carry out
research among the Tharu, I paid a courtesy call on
a high Nepali official close to the center of power.
After we had chatted politely of this and that for a few
minutes, he asked me about what I planned to do,
and I replied I intended to carry out a research project
about the Tharu. His reply was instructive; it was a
dismissive “Oh, those Indians!” That throwaway
remark encapsulates some of the problems of statebuilding, national identity formation and democratic
participation that characterizes Nepal today. That
such attitudes and perceptions endure, despite
a decade of “Peoples’ War” based in part on the
recognition of ethnic rights, is suggested in the recent
attempt (in 2009) by the late Maoist government
of Nepal to classify the Tharu as Madhesi (a word
dominant groups in Nepal have understood to mean
an “Indian” inhabitant of the Tarai)—a move that led
to the mobilization of Tharu throughout the Tarai in
protest, and the loss of several lives.
Although the Tarai has been central to the
economic viability of the Nepali state since its
inception, the people of that region have been
politically marginalized and treated with suspicion by
the hill-based elites who ruled the country. The Tharu
are not Madhesi and the Madhesi are not Indian, and
that remark indicates the limitations, and indeed the
failure, of the policy of “national integration” favored
by the panchayat regime to create a cohesive and
distinctive cultural identity that could encompass all
Nepalis. Where the Tharu are concerned, although
they were essential to the state when the Tarai was

malarial (both for their labor and for their role
as revenue collectors), they became marginalized
when malaria was controlled and it became possible
for hill people to settle in the Tarai year round.
That marginalization in turn led to a movement by
Tharu elites (a social stratum originating in the large
landlords and revenue collectors of former times) to
develop a sense of ethnic self-hood in the context of
a modernizing and centralizing state (see Guneratne
2002). At the same time, a great many Tharu,
especially in the Western Tarai, lost control of land to
settlers from the hills, and were reduced to conditions
of semi-serfdom. The movement to free these bonded
labor (kamaiya) became one of the defining political
struggles for western Tharu in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries, and coupled with the
violence they endured at the hands of the state—
whose agents viewed all Tharu in the Western Tarai as
Maoists during the Peoples’ War—radicalized them,
reinforced their ethnic consciousness and enhanced
their organizational skills, all of which were on
display during the two Tharu andolan of 2009.
The ethnic label Tharu is shared by well over a
million people who live in the Tarai. According to
the 2001 census, there were over 1.5 million Tharus
in Nepal, while smaller populations live in adjacent
areas of India. The Tharu consider themselves to be
indigenous to the Tarai, predating both Madhesi and
hill people as inhabitants of that region, and playing
an essential if subordinate role in the emergence of the
modern Nepali state. Although they share the same
ethnonym, the people known as the Tharu belong to
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a number of communities that vary greatly over the extent
of the Tarai, in terms of the languages they speak and their
cultural practices. The various Tharu languages are related to
each other in much the same way that the Romance languages
are; that is, they all belong to the great North Indian branch
of the Indo-European language family. When Tharus from
different areas gather, they usually turn to Hindi or Nepali
to communicate. These languages are widely spoken by most
Tarai people, Tharu and non-Tharu alike. Life for most Tharu
has changed dramatically in the last 50 years because the Tarai
has become the focus of the largest population shift in Nepal’s
history, which has brought hill people in their hundreds of
thousands to settle in Nepal’s fertile lowlands. This process
has been encouraged by the state as a way to consolidate its
control over a region whose population was viewed with
distrust.
I examine in this paper the relations of the various ethnic
groups that share the ethnonym Tharu to the states that
encompassed them during the past two centuries. As the
hill polities evolved into the modern state of Nepal, defined
by national boundaries, Weberian bureaucratization and
centralized political control, there has been a sharpening
and politicization of group identities that formerly had
little or no political significance. As in many multi-ethnic
states, national identity formation was based on the culture
and practices of the ruling elites and their ethnic kin, and
provided no space for the culture of subaltern populations,
which were collectively in the majority. Nepal’s approach has
been different from that pursued in India, which has dealt
with its diversity by embracing it; Indian nationalism is not
predicated on the language and culture of a single group but
of loyalty to the state as the representative of all its people (cf.
Roy 2007). In contrast, the ideology of national integration
as it has been deployed in Nepal has essentially meant, to the
country’s political elite, the organization of identity around
the cultural symbol of the dominant classes. This is the
process that Bista has called nepalization (which many Tarai
activists prefer to call paharization). This concept of national
integration emphasizes the cultural (narrowly conceived) at
the expense of the political; what it does not do is to provide
those historically marginal and subaltern groups an equal
place at the table, nor does it provide space for their cultures in
the envisioning of Nepali nationhood. Mishra has pointed out
with respect to the Tarai, for example, the poor representation
of Tarai people in positions of power nationally, and notes
that their relatively low representation in parliament is due in
part to the preference of national political parties to nominate
hill immigrants to the Tarai for Tarai seats (Mishra 1992). It
is also the case that parliamentary constituencies in the Tarai
represent larger populations than do hill constituencies,
thereby diluting even further the potential impact of the Tarai
and its non-pahari population in national politics. This lack
of integration into the administration of the state and to state
patronage, as well as the pervasive discrimination encountered
by both the Madeshi and the Tharu, has undermined both the
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cultural and political projects of the Nepali state.
The central point with regard to Tharu-state relations
is that in the period before the 1950s, the Tharus were
essential to the successful accomplishment of state projects
in the Tarai and in the post-1950s period, they were not. The
Tharu were reputedly the only people who could survive
in the malarial Tarai (although there was significant Indian
immigration into some regions of the Tarai, especially in the
east), and as such were an essential source of both labor and
revenue administration. While the Tharu were essential to
the successful exploitation of the Tarai in pre-modern times,
the Tarai was essential to the economic well-being of the
emerging Nepali state. It is perhaps even more important
today. Before modern times, the revenues that hill states
derived from the Tarai came from agriculture, timber (to feed
the railways of British India), the capture and sale of elephants
and pasturage of cattle. In all these activities, Tharus played
important roles. They were first of all a source of labor in
agriculture, although their numbers never proved adequate
for this task. But local Tharu elites were also indispensable
to the state as intermediaries between the state and the local
societies that the state sought to control; they were revenue
collectors, minor judicial officials and were entrusted with
various administrative tasks. Many Tharus were active in the
timber trade. Finally, Tharus dominated (and still do) work
related to elephants. In the post 1950s period however, the
Tharu ceased to play these roles, with the exception of their
role in the elephant stables, where they still predominate. The
bureaucratization of the revenue administration marginalized
the Tharu even as it benefitted hill castes with closer ties to
state power. Finally, the eradication of malaria resolved once
and for all the Tarai’s perennial problem of labor. As I will
discuss below, this transformation had its impact on the
shaping of Tharu ethnic identity.
In what follows, I shall examine the relations that existed
between Tharu societies and the states that encompassed
them, focusing on the state policies that shaped Tharu identity
in the modern period in India and Nepal.
THE THARU AND THE STATE IN INDIA
Judging by the disproportionate attention paid to them in
the writings of colonial officials in the northern districts of the
United Provinces, the British seem to have been particularly
fascinated by the Tharu, whose diligence as cultivators was
often used as a foil to make more disparaging observations
about the peasantry settled in caste-based villages. Walter
Hamilton, for instance, devotes a third of his account of
Gorakhpur District to the Tharu, who formed only a minute
part of its population (Hamilton 1820). W.W.Hunter noted
approvingly, “They are first-rate cultivators . . . Those who
have dealings with them say they are far more upright and
honest than the ordinary Champaran rayat” (Hunter 1877:
245). Nesfield spoke of them in the following terms: “The
Thârus are, for the most part, a peaceful and good-natured
race, following without question, as if by a law of nature, the

customs and maxims of their ancestors” (quoted in Crooke
1896: 403), while Charles Williams described them in the
Oudh Census report in 1869 as “courageous and goodnatured, peaceful and hardworking . . . mutually helping each
other in cultivation and adjusting among themselves all the
affairs of their little communities” (Williams 1869: 111). The
generally positive characterization of the Tharu in the colonial
accounts was doubtless reinforced by the British assumption
that the Tharus were immune to malaria (although some
officials disputed that; see for example Cavenagh 1851: 94)
and thus the only people who could be depended on to
provide labor in the Tarai districts of the Raj. By the same
token, some British officials were reluctant to enforce policies
that might drive the Tharu across the border into Nepal. For
instance, the British gave the Tharu some latitude to distill
their own liquor (a practice otherwise prohibited to the
peasantry), subscribing to the belief, apparently promoted
by the Tharu themselves, that liquor was essential for their
survival in the unhealthy climate of the Tarai (Crooke 1896:
405). The Tharu thus appear to have enjoyed a relatively
privileged position—privileged, that is, relative to adjacent
Indian ethnic groups—in those areas of the Tarai controlled
by the British following the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepal
War.
The importance of the Tharu to the economy of the Tarai
is particularly salient in the British accounts. The problem
the British faced was that of finding adequate labor in their
state forests in the Tarai, as well as to cultivate land in the
Tarai districts, and the Tharu apparently furnished a reliable
supply. An excellent example of this understanding and how
it operated to the advantage of the Tharu comes from the
Pilibhit district in 1851. The Board of Revenue was asked
to rule on a claim by a local raja to an estate (the taluka of
Namikmutta), which was occupied by a community of Tharu
who had made a separate revenue settlement with a British
official. The Board ruled against the raja, justifying their
decision in the following terms:
The arrangement . . . was, in the opinion of
the Board, likely to conduce to clearing and
populating a part of the country which it had
not only been found hitherto impossible to
improve, but which had been in a state of
continual deterioration, and as the people in
question [i.e. the Tharu] . . . are described as
. . . the only persons whose lives are safe in the
climate had expressed the desire to undertake
the cultivation of the Tract at their own risk . .
. the Board were of opinion that they ought not
to cramped in their undertaking by any official
control.1

The British categorized the Tharu under a variety of
1. The Governor-General in Council, Revenue Department, 13th August
1851. India and Bengal Despatches, 6th – 27th August, 1851, Vol. 72. India
Office Library, E/4/811.

different labels in the various censuses, from aboriginal tribe
in the first countrywide census of 1872 to forest tribe in
1891 and later, in 1921, to “hill and forest tribe” (Srinivasan
and Ranjan 2003: 204-205). There is of course no objective
definition of “tribe”, and the British used different criteria at
different times. In general, groups of people living beyond
the control of caste-based states in ecologically remote areas
were thought of as tribal. In the 1872 census, religion was
used to distinguish aboriginal people from Hindus, while
in the 1935 Government of India Act, religion, which had
come in for a great deal of criticism from census officials as
a useful criterion by which to distinguish between “tribal”
and “Hindu” was abandoned in favor of ecological criteria
(i.e., people living in “forests, hills and mountains” were
considered backward tribes) (Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003:
205). The Tharu however, did not receive the legal status of
“tribe” in India in the immediate aftermath of independence,
but had to struggle for many years to achieve it.
From Backward Class to Scheduled Tribe
Where the Tharus of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are
concerned, despite their classification as “tribal” in colonial
India, they did not immediately receive the status of Scheduled
Tribe following independence. It took a protracted struggle
lasting half a century for the Tharu of Champaran (Bihar)
to achieve reclassification as a Scheduled Tribe (see below).
The Tharu in Uttar Pradesh, who were the largest of the five
“tribes” of that state prior to the separation of Uttaranchal
(Uttarakhand) (Maiti 2004: 26) did not achieve Scheduled
Tribe status until 1967, because the first Chief Minister of
the state, G.B.Pant, was opposed to the recognition of any
tribes within the state “to avoid the politics of tribalism”
(Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003: 219). Following the separation
of Uttaranchal, the Tharu are the sole remaining Scheduled
Tribe in U.P. According to Srinivasan and Ranjan, the Tharu
in U.P. were eventually granted Scheduled Tribe (ST) status
because “their small numbers did not affect state politics in
any significant way” (ibid). They add, “The privileges flowing
from ST status as also the economic opportunities opened up
by the aggressive cultivation of the western terai . . . helped
U.P. Tharus achieve a much more ‘developed’ status than
their Bihar brethren. For that very reason however, they have
become assimilated in the mainstream and lost their singular
identity” (ibid).
The most salient aspect of the relation between Tharus
and the state in post-independence India is that the various
Tharu populations are now classified as Scheduled Tribes,
which give them in principle access to certain privileges and
benefits. These included reserved seats in the legislature, as
well as reservations in government posts and in university
admissions (Galanter 1984). This is, in effect, a policy of
national integration, whose import is as much symbolic as
it is material. While these benefits encouraged groups to
hold on to their “tribal” identity (rather than, for instance,
seek to assimilate to “caste” society through processes of
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sanskritization), they did not necessarily encourage the
formation of pan-ethnic identities of the sort that took place
among the Tharu in Nepal (see Guneratne 2002).
During the British period, so-called tribal areas were given
a special status as “Scheduled Tracts” (Srinivasan & Ranjan
2003: 204). According to these authors, while one reason for
such special status—which exempted these areas from the
normal regulations—was the need to prevent tribal revolts,
such as had occurred in Bihar at various times during the
nineteenth century, it was also recognition of the particular
value of the forest and its produce. The forest provisions of
the British appear to have carried over to independent India
because we hear from R.C. Sharma, the author of some
monographs on Tharu villages that were part of the 1961
census that outsiders could not settle in the Rana Tharu
village of Bankati without the permission of the Divisional
Forest Officer, and that villagers were subject to his order.
Sharma adds that the Forest Department allowed forest
villages such as this within their jurisdiction “solely to
afford a permanent supply of suitable local labour” (Sharma,
1965:17). In addition, the Tharu living under the jurisdiction
of the Forest Department were apparently prohibited from
seeking outside employment under the terms of the settlement
that allowed them to live in these forest villages. Sharma’s
account suggests that local officials of the Forest Department
exercised a great deal of power over the lives of the Tharu
under their jurisdiction. The Forest Department dealt with
Tharu villagers through the Tharu pradhan, who was also
responsible for collecting the revenue and delivering it to the
Forest office. That Tharu relations with the Forest Department
were often contentious is indicated by one of the aims of
the local Tharu Association, which was to safeguard Tharus
“from harassment by the officials of the Forest Department”
(Sharma 1965: 35).2 Forest Officers would sometimes remove
Tharu pradhans from their posts, an action that would invite
the intervention of the Tharu Association to redress. Even
so, Sharma characterizes the Tharu of this forest village as
docile, illiterate people lacking “any political consciousness”
(Sharma, 1965: 36); even the President and the Secretary of
the Tharu Association, he notes, were non-Tharu.
I have argued elsewhere (Guneratne 2002) that an
important factor for the different approaches taken by the
Tharu in Nepal and India to the question of their unity as
an ethnic category was that they inhabited two different
states, which structured in different ways their relations with
ethnic groups within their boundaries. Furthermore, in India,
the Tharu fell within two different political jurisdictions,
the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Recent work by two
Indian anthropologists, Amrit Srinivasan and Akhilesh
Ranjan, enable me to fill out the details of that argument,
with particular reference to the struggles of the Tharu of
2. This contentiousness continues today, as described in a recent news
report in the Hindustan Times, which refers to over 200 cases being filed
against Tharu villagers living in the Valmikinagar Tiger Sanctuary’s buffer
zone in Bihar for various infringements of the Forest Act (Verma 2010).
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Champaran to achieve recognition as a Scheduled Tribe,
which they accomplished on January 8, 2003 after a 50-year
campaign. The following discussion is based on their paper
(Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003).
Although the Tharus of Champaran were given the status
of a scheduled tribe in the census of 1941, they were not
included in the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1950, which gave
tribal people Scheduled status—and thus access to certain
privileges and benefits— in independent India for the first
time. Instead, in 1951, they were listed as a Backward Class,
a status that, in effect, placed them in the lower rungs of the
local caste hierarchy. This move was resisted by the Tharu,
who had been claiming Ksatriya status since the 1940s, but to
no avail; according to Srinivasan and Ranjan, “Their economic
deprivation worked against them and they could not achieve
their goal” (2003: 211). In fact, in 1955 the first Backward
Classes Commission had also recommended that they be listed
as a Scheduled Tribe, and the Tharu in Uttar Pradesh had
enjoyed that status since 1967. The Champaran Tharu used
both these facts to argue for a change in their official status.
The Bihar state government, however, was reluctant to list the
Tharu in the Schedule because of the high concentration of
tribal people in southern Bihar (which separated from the rest
of Bihar in 2000 to form the new state of Jharkhand); they
had no desire to increase the numbers of tribals in the state,
presumably for political reasons. According to Srinivasan and
Ranjan,
The Tharu of Champaran lost their bargaining
power vis-à-vis the state on two counts: (i) they
were ‘tribals’ but isolated in the wrong part of the
state—northwest, whereas it is the south which
has today won full statehood for themselves,
on the basis of an autonomous tribal identity,
and (ii) They were BC but in a state where it
was eventually the Backwards such as the Yadav,
Koeri and Kurmi, commercially wealthier and
better integrated with the upper caste society,
who would gain power (2003: 212).

The status of the Tharu as a Backward Class meant that
they were effectively marginalized in the politics of Bihar. First
of all, they were unable to benefit from programs directed at
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; they lost out again
in the political decentralization that took place with the
implementation of panchayati raj, when special provisions
were made for the political representation of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, for Backward Classes received
no special consideration. Nor were the Tharus, who were
politically marginalized and largely illiterate, able to compete
with more powerful, better organized and more numerous
Backward Class groups such as the Yadavs for the benefits
that were available to the Backward Classes.
The Tharu began an organized effort to change their status
in 1973, because as Srinivasan and Ranjan note, “The educated
youth wanted this for jobs, the uneducated for financial

support from the state agency and the rich Tharus for more
legal/financial benefits based on state assistance” (2003: 214).
The state government eventually submitted the claims of the
Tharu to Scheduled Tribe status to the Union government in
1996, and final approval, as I have noted above, did not arrive
until 2003. By that time, with the inclusion of most of Bihar’s
tribal population in the new state of Jharkhand, the Tharu
as a tribal category represented only a small and marginal
minority with little impact on state politics. According to
the Hunger Free Bihar Campaign, following on the partition
of Bihar, the State government has no data on the current
extent of its tribal population and lacks a tribal commission,
making it virtually impossible for Tharu and other tribals
(Gond and Santhal) to benefit from the Centre’s programs for
tribals (Banerjee 2009). As happened in Nepal, the poverty of
their communities and the exploitation and marginalization
to which they are subject, have attracted many Tharu in Bihar
to the ranks of India’s Maoists (Jha 2010).
The status of Scheduled Tribe, with its attendant benefits
and linked to the fact of the minuscule numbers of Tharu
in the populations of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar means that
pan-Tharu ethnic unity is politically less salient in India than
it is in Nepal. Thus, while the trend in Nepal has been to
ethnic consolidation of the various Tharu groups, in India
this has not occurred. The two main concentrations of Tharu
population, in Champaran and Naini Tal, have maintained
separate ethnic organizations or caste associations. India’s
approach to state building allows for cultural difference
(given the size and complexity of India, and its democratic
politics, it has little alternative) while also allowing for the
more privileged and fortunate members of marginalized
communities opportunities for advancement. In Nepal, in
contrast, not only was cultural difference not recognized,
the state refused to create avenues to proactively integrate
into national public life historically marginalized groups and
provide them avenues for advancement within the structures
of the state. Although this is beginning to change under the
pressure of the various ethnically based political movements
that have emerged since 1990, and especially in the aftermath
of the Maoist insurgency, the face of the state in Nepal does
not truly reflect the cultural complexity of its population.
THE THARU AND THE STATE IN NEPAL
The Tharu enjoyed a great deal of autonomy with the
various states and principalities that existed in the hills prior
to the unification of Nepal. Our insight into the nature of
these relations owes a great deal to the lal mohar (royal
edicts) collected by the Tharu historian Tej Narayan Panjiar,
and published with commentaries (Krauskopff and Meyer
2000). What these documents, some of which date back three
hundred years, show is the reliance that the hill states placed
on local Tharu elites to manage the affairs of Tarai lands to
yield revenue to the state, and the great degree of autonomy
the Tharus appear to have enjoyed in their affairs. As revenue
collectors for the hill states, Tharu elites enjoyed the political

support of their masters, but were apparently left to manage
other aspects of their affairs more or less on their own terms.
There was relatively less impact on Tharu societies from
outside groups for a number of reasons. Observers in the
colonial period have remarked on the tendency of the Tharu
to retreat in the face of competition from other, perhaps
better-organized and more powerful ethnic groups. The Tarai
was a last refuge, whose malarial properties discouraged
other settlers from moving into the area. In addition, certain
qualities were attributed to the Tharu by their neighbors, a
fact remarked on by British writers. The British missionary
Knowles for instance noted that Tharu women of postmarriageable age were believed by outsiders to be witches,
with the power to turn a desi or a stranger into a wild animal
or destroy him slowly by fever. Tharuhat, he adds, is a
synonym for witch land (in Crooke 1896: 405). Fear of the
Tharu and fear of malaria kept outsiders at bay in many areas
of the Tarai, including Chitwan and the Naya Muluk, until the
malaria eradication program of the 1950s made Tarai lands
available to hill people for settlement. In the less malarial
Eastern Tarai however, there was an influx of people from
across the border, encouraged by the state, looking for land;
in these areas the Tharu appeared to have played the role of a
dominant, land-controlling caste.
The unification of Nepal led to a general erosion of the
autonomy that the Tharu elites had enjoyed in the conduct of
their affairs in the Tarai, as the state now sought to rationalize
the revenue collecting system. The Tharu jimidars became
agents of the state in a much more defined and centralized
bureaucratic hierarchy, a process that accelerated during the
Rana period, until, in the post-Rana period, they were made
redundant with the institution of a modern bureaucratic
apparatus. The Tharu elite went from being “little kings” to
servants of the state and then to being quite marginal to the
state’s administration of the Tarai.
The modern state
The radical transformation in the fortunes of the Tharu
begins in the 1950s. While the period of state consolidation
during the nineteenth century had seen erosion in the
autonomy of their position, Tharu communities in the Tarai
had had the access to resources they needed for their social and
cultural reproduction. The malaria eradication program set
in motion a process that brought various Tharu communities
into conflict with other ethnic groups as well as into contact
with each other and with the new values of modernization
and national integration as Nepalis enjoying—on paper at
least—the same rights as all other Nepalis. It is not that these
transformations had the same effect on all Tharus equally;
rather, what is significant is their impact on Tharu elites.
The most important change of course was in the nature
of the polity, which shifted from emphasizing the cultural
difference and fundamental inequality that characterizes the
subjects of the state and was the basis on which they were to
be ruled, to an emphasis on their cultural similarity (“national
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integration”) and their right to equal treatment. Thus the 1962
constitution of Nepal declares that all citizens have the right
to equal protection of the laws, and asserts that there shall
be no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste,
or tribe in application of the general laws and in respect of
appointment to public service (Agrawal, 1980). This of course
is the complete reverse of the legal principles enshrined in the
muluki ain of 1854. These ideals are reaffirmed in the 1990
constitution:
it is expedient to promulgate and enforce this
Constitution . . . by promoting amongst the
people of Nepal the spirit of fraternity and the
bond of unity on the basis of liberty and equality
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1991:
19)

The point is not that these admirable ideas were
implemented, for by and large they were not; what is important
is their impact on the consciousness of the rapidly emerging
educated and middle classes in Nepal, including significant
numbers of Tharu throughout the Tarai, and especially in the
eastern districts. This is well exemplified in the position taken
by elites in the Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha to the census of
1991. There, equipped with an acute understanding of the
significance of labels and their enumeration, they organized
to ensure that their ethnic brethren in villages across the Tarai
identified themselves as “Tharu” to the census enumerators.
The implication of this action is that the political significance
of the concept “Tharu” was less evident to the ordinary Tharu,
who had to be mobilized to give the politically necessary
response. If the numbers in that census are anything to go by,
this campaign had a very positive outcome.
The other changes that took place were the social, political,
and economic transformation of the Tarai, which was made
possible by the Malaria Eradication Project of the 1950s.
There is no denying that the Malaria Eradication Project was a
positive, desirable and necessary step in the development and
political evolution of Nepal. Like all development projects
however, the redistribution of land that took place as a result
of it created both beneficiaries and victims, and many of
those victims were people who had been living in these areas
before the malaria eradication project was implemented. The
impact on the Tharu was two fold. First, it closed off the land
frontier and brought to an end the mobility of Tharu society,
which derived from different kinds of tenurial systems and
adjustments to the burden of taxation (see Guneratne 1996).
Second, many Tharu lost land to better organized, literate
and sometimes-unscrupulous immigrants from the hills, who
acquired land cultivated by the Tharu in ways both legal and
illegal (Guneratne 2002). Tharus throughout the Tarai but
especially in the west came to share a common experience in
respect of hill immigrants, in which high castes from the hills
were blamed for the misfortunes that had overtaken Tharu
society.
The second transformation concerns the development of
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the Tarai. The opening of the Tarai brought in two significant
forms of development that shaped the relationship of the Tharu
to the state. The first of these was the establishment of a road
network connecting the eastern and the western Tarai and the
Tarai region to the hills. These roads facilitated the movement
of hill people into the Tarai, but they also made it easier for
Tharu in different districts to establish contact and interact
with one another in ways they could not have contemplated
earlier. This was further facilitated by the second important
infrastructural innovation: the establishment of schools and
the creation of a national curriculum based on the teaching of
the Nepali language and an interpretation of Nepali history,
culture and society based on the experience of the high caste
pahari groups that dominate the Nepali state. Roads and
schools gave the Tharu elite opportunities to engage one
another but also a language—Nepali—through which such
communication could be carried out. These schools became
a crucible in which a new ethnic consciousness began to take
shape.
The third transformation contributing to the delineating
of a Tharu identity was the socializing of the Tharu elite
into high caste cultural norms. For instance, the kanyadan
became the normative marriage ceremony, which facilitated
marriage across the boundaries of the different Tharu jat.
In other words, through the process of Nepalization, the
Tharu elite came to share cultural practices that facilitated
the establishment of relations among them and made
possible the emergence of a common Tharu identity. As I
have argued elsewhere (Guneratne 2002), one of the bases
of Tharu ethnic identity formation was the forging of kinship
links among the families of elite Tharu drawn from every
corner of the Tarai, which had not existed earlier. Prior to
the malaria eradication program, different groups of Tharu,
even those living in adjacent areas, had regarded each other as
belonging to different jat, and intermarriage was prohibited.
Now, not only have these prohibitions fallen by the wayside
with the emergence of a Tharu ethnic consciousness, but the
socializing of the elite into the national culture also gives
them a shared cultural idiom through which to communicate.
Thus, infrastructural changes have themselves helped to
shape a new symbolic framework in which people act and
give meaning to their world. The problem of intermarriage
in the absence of such a shared cultural idiom is succinctly
summed up in the words of a Tharu from Chitwan (note that
“language” here is also a metonym for culture in general):
It’s better to marry within your district.
Chaudharys of other districts speak somewhat
differently. So one would need to make some
changes in the way one speaks. This will be
a little difficult for one’s daughter. But if you
marry her off within your own district, there is
no language problem.

The malaria eradication program brought large numbers
of hill people to settle in the Tarai, turning the Tharu who had

lived there before they arrived into disadvantaged minorities.
The relations between Tharu and hill settlers appear to
differ qualitatively from the relations between Tharu and
immigrants into the Tarai from the border districts of India
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the latter
case, although these relations have not, to my knowledge,
been studied in any detail, there is some evidence to suggest
that the Tharu often occupied a position of power vis-à-vis
the newcomers. The Tharu, or at least their elites, served
the hill states as revenue functionaries, and thus were in a
position of authority from the outset, a fact indicated in the
Panjiar documents (Krauskopff and Meyer 2000) and the
recollections of Ramanand Singh (Guneratne 2002: 35).
The position however was very different with regard to the
hill immigrants in the post-Rana state. The impact of this
immigration was most strongly felt in the western half of the
Tarai, especially in the Far West and in the Inner Tarai valleys,
and here the Tharu were almost invariably on the losing side.
At worst, they lost land and ended up as bonded labor; at
best, local elites became junior partners in political processes
dominated by high-caste immigrants.
Chitwan exemplifies a situation where the immigration of
hill people have reduced the Tharu to a small minority, led
to the loss of Tharu land—but without the extreme effects,
such as kamaiya labor, found in the western Tarai—and
made Tharus the junior partners in the political affairs of
every major political party. One major difference between
Chitwan and some of the districts to the west is that although
many Tharus have lost land in the aftermath of the malaria
eradication program, the district lacks the landlords and large
estates dominated by high castes that characterize the western
Tarai districts. Relations between Tharus and Brahmans in
Chitwan are less imbued with the tension and hostility that
I noticed in Dang in the early 1990s, and this is probably
due to the absence of a system of bonded labor delineated
along ethnic lines, the presence of large (by local standards)
Tharu landowners in almost every village in the heavily
Tharu-populated eastern part of the district, and the fact that
most households control some land, however inadequate.
The peculiar circumstances of Chitwan during Rana times—
first, its position as a buffer between Nepal and the British,
and subsequently its status as a hunting preserve for the
Ranas—meant that there was no significant proportion of its
land under birta tenure. While there does not appear to be
much social interaction among ordinary Brahman and Tharu
villagers, each group keeping more or less to itself, there is a
great deal more among the elites, who may have political ties
by working together in the same political parties and who
invite each other to ritual occasions and life cycle rites.
Even the elite, however, which has the closest ties—
personal, ritual, and political—to Brahmin society, views it
with reserve. It is the Brahmin qua Brahmin who is singled
out for opprobrium, Chhetris and Newars somewhat less so
(although Chhetri tends to be a category lumped together
with Brahmin as one undifferentiated whole). Gurungs,

Magars, Tamangs and Tarai ethnic groups are not marked
in rural Chitwan in the way the first three mentioned ethnic
groups are. It is at the hands of Brahmins, and to a lesser
extent, of Chhetris and Newars, that Tharus have lost land
and have felt themselves to be cheated and exploited. This
has been a cause of resentment among Tharus throughout
the Tarai, wherever they have been brought into contact with
large numbers of hill settlers.
These factors have led many Tharus to interpret
their experiences in a particular way. The state policies
referred to above—malaria eradication, the development
of communications, the creation of a national system of
education, the incorporation of peripheral regions into a
national economy which in turn is tightly integrated into the
regional and ultimately the global economy, and the creation
of a modern bureaucracy (modern in its form, although not
necessarily in the value system of its cadre)—is part and
parcel of contemporary state building. The political buzzword
in Nepal in the panchayat era was national integration and
certain kinds of integration—economic and administrative—
did in fact take place. But, as the case of the Tharu indicates,
the creation of a national identity proved to be a much
more complex task. It is clear that from the perspective of
the government, national integration meant the subsuming
of ethnic particularities in a greater, “Nepali” whole. But the
practice of the state (or of its agents) served more to remind
those groups not at the center of power of their marginality
and otherness and thus reinforce an emerging sense of the
importance of ethnic distinctiveness.
Two things should be remembered here. The first is
that the official ideology and rhetoric of the modernizing
state promises one thing even as it delivers another. What
it promises, through documents such as the constitution,
through public rhetoric but also through such rituals as the
vote, is the putative political equality of all Nepal’s people.
But what is more important are not these promises but the
impact of these ideas on the leaders and intellectuals of the
various communities. For most of Nepal’s impoverished
villagers, engaged in the daily hardscrabble of existence, these
promises may not have meant much, but they had a much
greater impact on the thinking of those with some education
who, in the absence of a private sector of any importance,
looked to the state for advancement. But for many of them
such advancement was not forthcoming; playing by the
rules—passing the SLC, going to college—did not lead
to employment in the state sector, in which the game of
patronage politics is played out, and this was interpreted by
many Tharu as discrimination against them.
The kamaiya problem and the Maoist insurgency
Given the fundamental historical inequality among the
different ethnic groups of Nepal, which was grounded in
and structured by the law of the state until 1963, one cannot
treat as equal people who are not in fact equal. Structural
inequality cannot be eliminated by simple fiat; the structure
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itself must be disassembled and the relations among the
various components of society reconstituted. In a primarily
agrarian society, this would require a comprehensive agrarian
reform, which Nepal has hitherto avoided. This problem is
highlighted in the state’s response to the kamaiya problem,
arguably one of the most salient issues for western Tharu in
the 1990s, which exemplified this structural inequality in an
extreme form. A significant proportion of Tharu labor in the
western Tarai was bonded to the service of mostly high-caste
landlords (although some Tharu landlords also use bonded
labor), a state of affairs that developed in the post-Rana
period with origins in pre-existing systems of labor relations
(Guneratne 2002: 96-107; Krauskopff 2008: 216-228; Rankin
1999). Bonded labor is not of course confined to either the
Tharu or the Western Tarai, but it is among the Tharu and in
the Western Tarai that the movement to eliminate this form of
labor exploitation received its strongest expression.
That it became a salient issue was due to the initiative
of young men from Dang, who founded the NGO known as
Backward Society Education (BASE) and struggled for many
years, often at great personal risk to themselves, to bring
the system to an end (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff 2008).
Their struggle was not simply against the existing structures
of power in rural western Nepal, but against bureaucratic
indifference and the hostility of the state apparatus. Despite
the presence of Tharu landlords who controlled kamaiya, the
kamaiya issue was understood by Tharu activists in Dang in
the early 1990s as a problem that Tharus had with high caste
immigrants from the hills. A class issue had taken on a distinct
ethnic tinge, and the government’s lack of interest in the issue
could only be understood as support for landlords, many of
whom were important local members of national political
parties or local employees of the state bureaucracy. While the
government’s hand on the kamaiya issue was eventually forced
by NGO activists and mass demonstrations, the state gave in
with poor grace, and took no steps to provide either land or
livelihood to the kamaiya following their emancipation. One
commentator describes the process of kamaiya emancipation
as “haphazard, inhuman and careless” (Chhetri 2005:41).
One last factor shaping Tharu identity in the present—
at least as far as the Western Tarai is concerned—must be
mentioned. That is the Maoist Insurgency or People’s War
(1996-2006), which took the lives of 1200 Tharu in Bardiya,3
and hundreds more in other Tarai districts. If the estimate of
14,000 dead in the decade-long conflict is accurate, the Tharu
as an ethnic group bore a disproportionately high share of the
human cost of the war—perhaps ten percent of the fatalities.
According to the UN-OHCHR,
Local people and Tharu and non-Tharu civil
society representatives repeatedly stated to
OHCHR that the distinction between the
3. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UN-OHCHR) (2008), for documentation of atrocities committed on
Tharu in Bardiya district.
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CPN-M insurgency and ongoing Tharu and land
rights movements became blurred for many
high-caste landowners. The Tharu population
was increasingly associated with the CPN-M
and the view that “all Tharus are Maoists”
became common among the landowning class.
Furthermore, through the links of kinship and
caste between these landowners and members
of the high-caste groups of hill origin that
dominated State institutions, this became the
prevailing mentality of local authorities and
security forces alike. In this context, members
of the Tharu and other marginalised groups
claiming their rights vis a vis landowners or
State authorities were at increasing risk of being
labeled as Maoists and insurgents (UN-OHCHR
2008: 19-20).

Many Tharu in the western districts were recruited by the
Maoists (and some of them were very likely liberated kamaiya
left destitute to their own devices). Many others, like ordinary
villagers throughout Nepal during this period, were coerced
into helping them, but the military and police came to see all
Tharu as Maoists and carried out a campaign of repression,
rape, torture and extra judicial killings against the Tharu
population. The most intense period of violence was during
2002. According to the UN, Tharu accounted “for over
85% (135) of the persons disappeared by State authorities
in cases documented by OHCHR” (UN-OHCHR 2008: 6).
Tharu organizations and leaders were also targeted by the
Maoists, who saw in Backward Society Education (BASE)
a serious rival which could claim the loyalty of most of the
Tharu population of the Western Tarai districts and which
was effectively organized on the ground. A number of Tharu
leaders were assassinated and on a number of occasions,
Maoists destroyed BASE infrastructure, including the BASE
training center in Chakhaura village in Dang, one of the
original villages in which BASE began.
The militancy demonstrated by the Tharu and the
expansion of their Tarai-wide organizing, most recently in
the establishment of a federation of Tharu NGOs (Tharu
Indigenous NGO federation, with Dilli Chaudhary of BASE
as its general secretary) has its roots in this intense experience
of violence. But it must be noted that the Tharu have
demonstrated over the years an ability to organize nationally
right down to the village level, first in the organization of the
Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha, and then, more effectively perhaps
in terms of mobilizing popular support, in the organization of
BASE in the five western Tarai districts. The accommodationist
approach of the Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha towards the state
has been replaced by a much more confrontationalist and
militant approach by the Tharu leadership (of which BASE
and the Sabha are but two, albeit important, components),
exemplified in the bandhs of 2009 against the Maoist
government’s attempt to categorize the Tharu as Madhesi.
The new politics of the Tharu, inspired by the provisions of
the International Labor Organization’s convention 169 on the

rights of indigenous people, seeks a federal province of their
own, proportional representation in every sphere of the state
based on caste/ethnicity in which the Tharu will be treated as
a separate ethnic group and not subsumed under a broader
category such as madhesi or janajati, the appointment of
Tharu to major state offices in the area of Tharuhat (which
is coterminous with the Tarai) and the rehabilitation of
the kamaiyas. These are the main demands of the newly
established Tharu Indigenous NGO Federation.4
CONCLUSION
The official culture of the Nepali state until quite recently
was based, as I pointed out earlier, on the culture of the
dominant ethnic groups. In some respects, this was inevitable;
it is the language (or dialect) and culture of the elites in
society that achieve prestige and status, and, where the state
is concerned, becomes the basis around which national
identities are usually organized. For Nepal, it was also one
of the most politically effective ways to mark the country’s
autonomous identity vis-à-vis India. Thus, the culture and
religion of the dominant ethnic groups was congruent with
that officially espoused and promoted by the state. The
domination of Nepali society by high castes thus had three
bases of support: the economic, political and cultural, each
reinforcing the others. In pre-modern Nepal, this fact was of
less consequence politically; there was no proactive attempt
on the part of the state to shape a common culture or national
identity.
It is probably uncontroversial to argue that there was
no official national culture as such in the Rana state and its
predecessors, even though the cultural assumptions of the elites
who controlled the state informed their approach to matters
of governance. Jang Bahadur’s muluki ain is very much of an
elite document elucidating an elite point of view, but its point
was to emphasize the difference between rulers and ruled, to
stress the various things that the different components of the
Nepali population did not share. State-building in modern
Nepal however is predicated on the assumption that a state
must have a national culture and a national identity, and this
is pursued through both formal legislative enactments—such
as the legal status of Nepal as a Hindu state, in force until
2006—and through more indirect means, such as a national
system of education in which instruction is carried out in
the national language and through which a national ideology
can be imparted. The state’s project had been, to paraphrase
Eugen Weber, to turn peasants into Nepalis, but without
much commitment to liberty, equality or fraternity. The
difference between the Rana state and its successor was that
for the first, the organization of the population and its relation
to the state was predicated on the fact of cultural difference,
which was stressed; for its successor, this relationship was
based on a wish for cultural similarity on the state’s terms
and the rejection of those politically salient aspects of cultural
4. See the Federation’s website at http://www.tharufed.org.np

difference, such as ethnicity and language.
And yet modern Nepal’s attempts to create a national
identity around the symbols meaningful to those elites at the
center of national power have not borne much fruit, as political
events in Nepal over the last dozen years or so demonstrate.
The rise of both the janajati and madhesi movement and the
Maoist insurgency, as well as social movements to press for
Dalit demands, speaks to a profound alienation from both the
structure and the symbols of the Nepali state. Dev Raj Dahal
has commented that “the movements of ethnic groups and
nationalities tend to challenge the self-referential rationality
of the unitary Hindu state and argue for its federalization
and secularization” and he quotes Mario Diani to this effect:
“What is challenged is not only the uneven distribution of
power and/or economic goods, but socially shared meanings
as well, that is the ways of defining and interpreting reality”
(Dahal, n.d.; Diani 2000: 163). The removal of the heavy
handed repression of ethnic identities that occurred during
the panchayat period has led to the efflorescence of the
politicized ethnic identities that were waiting in the wings for
their moment on the national stage, and the case of the Tharu,
who have the oldest registered ethnic association in Nepal, is
a good example of this.
Nepal failed in the post-Rana period to come to terms with
its feudal history and its history of fundamental inequality
among ethnic groups and transform those conditions in
democratic ways. Consequently, it seems they are likely to
be transformed in undemocratic ways, and one sort of ethnic
repression might well be replaced by another. The ugly
underside of ethnic federalism is ethnic cleansing, and there
are reports that this is already happening in some parts of
the Tarai—although the Tharu are not involved (see Miklian
2008: 8; Tiwari 2007). The Rana state and the states that
preceded it acknowledged and legitimized the reality of status
inequality among ethnic groups; that, it might be argued, was a
fundamental aspect of their purpose. The Rana state enshrined
that inequality in the legal code of 1854, and the post-Rana
state, in an admirable acknowledgement of democratic ideas,
abolished formal recognition of it. In panchayat Nepal,
dependent both on the ideology of modernization and on the
fiscal support of the outside world, it was necessary that all
ethnic groups should be granted formal equality, whatever the
social reality. The failure to make that promise meaningful
accounts in large part for the current state of affairs, and
certainly for the resonance of ethnic issues in what would
otherwise be a class struggle. Krauskopff has pointed out
that the purely class (or economic) aspects have been pushed
aside by ethnic demands (Krauskopff 2008: 241). That
ethnicity is bound up with class is a fact of Nepali life that the
CPN-Maoist has been able to successfully exploit in its quest
for power, but whether it can control or channel the ethnic
demands it has helped to unleash is another matter altogether.
Events in the Tarai of the last four years suggest that it cannot.
Contrary to the views of that highly placed Nepali official over
twenty years ago, the Tharu (and the Madhesi) are Nepali and
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not Indian, but they seek to be Nepali on their own terms, not
those historically imposed on them by the state.

Hunter, W.W., 1877. A Statistical Account of Bengal. Vol. 13:Tirhut
and Champaran. London: Trübner and Co.
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